Resilience Roundup Issue ArchiveThe role of error in organizing behaviourIncident Reviews in High-Hazard Industries: Sense Making and Learning Under Ambiguity and AccountabilityHRO and RE: a pragmatic perspectiveSafe operation as a social constructA Shared Pilot-Autopilot Control Architecture for Resilient FlightCoping With a Mass Casualty: Insights into a Hospital’s Emergency Response and Adaptations After the Formosa Fun Coast Dust ExplosionDistant Supervision--Local Action Given the Potential for SurpriseIncident Command and Information Flows in a Large-Scale Emergency OperationCollaborative Cross-Checking to Enhance ResilienceCognitive Work of Hypothesis Exploration during Anomaly ResponseEssentials of resilience, revisitedBootstrapping Multiple Converging Cognitive Task Analysis Techniques for System DesignExperimental study on the effect of procedure under unexpected situationsAbove the Line, Below the LineManaging the Hidden Costs of CoordinationTen Challenges for Making Automation a "Team Player" in Joint Human-Agent ActivityFour concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of resilience engineeringSafety II professionals: How resilience engineering can transform safety practiceVigilance Latencies to Aircraft Detection among NORAD Surveillance OperatorsMacrocognitionWhen mental models go wrong. Co-occurrences in dynamic, critical systemsA Sensemaking Lens on ReliabilityOrganizing for Resilience - Part 3 - OrganizationsOrganizing For Resilience - Group ResilienceOrganizing For Resilience - Individual ResilienceHandoff strategies in settings with high consequences for failure: lessons for health care operationsExtemporaneous Adaptation to Evolving Complexity: A Case Study of Resilience in HealthcareA Few Observations on the Marvelous Resilience of Bone and Resilience EngineeringUsing Observational Study As A Tool For Discovery: Uncovering Cognitive And Collaborative Demands And Adaptive StrategiesResilience Engineering New directions for measuring and maintaining safety in complex systems Part 2Resilience Engineering: New directions for measuring and maintaining safety in complex systemsGaps in the continuity of care and progress on patient safetyIllusions of explanation: A critical essay on error classificationLearning from Automation Surprises And 'Going Sour' AccidentsThe strengths and limitations of teams for detecting problemsA Rose by Any Other Name...Would Probably Be Given an AcronymCan We Trust Best Practices?Those found responsible have been sackedA Sense Making ExperimentIronies of AutomationHow Adaptive Systems FailBeing BumpableCognitive Systems Engineering: New wine in new bottlesNavigating through Large Display Networks in Dynamic Control ApplicationsUncovering the Requirements of Cognitive WorkPatient Boarding in the Emergency DepartmentEssential characteristics of resilienceAnticipatory ThinkingCommon Ground and Coordination in Joint Activity - Part 2Common Ground and Coordination in Joint Activity - Part 1Shift Changes, Updates, and the On-Call Architecture in Space Shuttle Mission ControlThe Role of Software in Spacecraft AccidentsLearning From Organizational Incidents: Resilience Engineering for High-Risk Process EnvironmentsVoice Loops as Coordination Aids in Space Shuttle Mission ControlHow in the World Did We Ever Get into That Mode?Drifting into failure: theorizing the dynamics of disaster incubationTraining organizational resilience in escalating situationsNine Steps to Move Forward from ErrorHow Unexpected Events Produce An Escalation Of Cognitive And Coordinative DemandsFixation Errors: Failures to Revise Situation Assessment in Dynamic and Risky SystemsResilience Weekly - Cognitive demands and activities in dynamic fault managementProcess tracing methodsReconstructing human contributions to accidents: the new view on error and performanceThe contribution of a latent human failures to the breakdown of complex systemsThe Logic of FailureThe high reliability organization perspectiveApplying systems thinking to analyze and learn from eventsThe 'problem' with automation: inappropriate feedback and interaction, not 'over-automation'Human error and the problem of causality in analysis of accidentsMistaking Error